


Thesis.
Progress of Theistic Thought
Since Kant.

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
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Thesis

Progress of Theistic Thought Since Kant.

"The kind of philosophy which one chooses depends on the kind of man one is. For a philosophic system is not a dead set of furniture which one can take down or dispose of as one pleases; but it is enlivened with a soul by the man who has it" - Fichte.

April 1898.




Introduction.

In the following pages an attempt will be made to give an account of the Progress of Theistic Thought since Kant. The subject is indeed formidable presenting many different aspects. It is hence of the greatest importance that the exact limits of the subject and method of treatment be stated at the outset.

"Theistic Thought" is a very comprehensive term. In it may be included the whole body of ecclesiastical legislation on this branch. Such we discard. Our task is avowedly that of stating as concisely as possible the different movements which have contributed to the present order. This indicates some progress.

Progress implies the incoming of new life. In science it indicates innovation, in civilization culture, in theism the attainment of a more consistent view of the relation of the Infinite to the finite.

To note these movements, sometimes more apparent than real may seem to lead us far afield. A beginning will be made with Kant and his problem. This leads to the rival



sources which he in a measure united. His own contribution is by no means small. And yet in attempting to get clear of the sensationist on the one hand and the rationalist on the other he too fell into difficulty. His contribution to the issue may be characterized by extreme transcendentalism. This his followers attempted to remedy by insisting on divine immanence.

Of these Hegel was chief. His views will be noted elsewhere. They are ambiguous and destructive to any theory of knowledge &c. Between these extreme views there is an opportunity for progress toward consistency.

This method is noteworthy because it emphasises the necessity of reaching a theistic view which will meet all the demands of life - intellectual, moral aesthetic and religious. It does not attempt to explain all the mysteries of the universe but seeks to place them on a rational basis. In this there is progress.

I.

There are three possible lines along which discussion of the divine may move - deistic, pantheistic and theistic. To each of these current usages gives a kind of definiteness. Pantheism may take two forms. It may identify God with the world or so emphasise the divine as to reduce the finite order to a fleeting show. Both views abolish the distinction between God and the world. Opposed to this is the deistic view which places so much stress upon the transcendence of God that he is removed from the laws of nature and the thought of mankind entirely. Such a view of the Infinite has been supported by many "proofs". The theistic view is a compromise between these views. It seeks to recognize both the immanence and transcendence of God in such a way that the demands of both head and heart shall be satisfied. It is contrasted & tremed much.

That such a contrast is found in modern speculation is evident. There is much progress for "those who have ears" but discord for others. Bacon and Descartes are the sources from the former spring the experimentalists, from

Sheldon,
Hist. of Ind.
Vol. II, P. 44

the latter the Rationalists. Both opposed the scholastic overvaluation of the syllogism. Both emphasised the arranging of the known in preference to discovering the unknown. Both insisted on analysis and thoroughness of method. But here they parted company. Bacon's maxim was observe, experiment and arrange results - Descartes' intuition and deduction.

In making such historical contrasts care must be taken not to unduly press into prominence a hasty generalization. Failure to observe this fertile source of fallacy has led to the wildest speculation. The things accomplished by the aid of rhetorical flourishes and so called "movements" surpass the days of miracles. Yet such a contrast is not without value. Windelband (Hist. of Phil, P. 408) says that the seventeenth century is regarded as the age of individualism. This in its philosophic use implies a tendency toward pantheism (Seth or Theism). Such a movement was followed by the individualism of the eighteenth century - a movement which implies the separation of the individual from the first cause or


disseu. Fruitless search for the God of disseu culminated in atheism. This excursus leads us back to Descartes the starting point. The influence of Bacon comes in properly in the eighteenth century when Locke plays so prominent a part.

Descartes began by universal doubt and advanced only as he was sure of his ground. His view may be briefly summarized as follows: Science must have a fixed ground if it would be fixed and abiding. Search for this demands doubt of all objects of sense. To one thing we must adhere - the truth of our own existence. If this be doubted we find but added proof of existence. Hence *cogito ergo sum*, is the primal ground upon which the certainty of all knowledge depends. From this point the nature of the mind can be made out. I who doubt am distinct from extension, figure or anything which can be predicated of body. I am a thinking being, i.e. mind, soul, reason. Mind is thus the essential thing. It can be apprehended without any of the attributes of body. It must be thought not imaged. This certainty becomes Descartes rule.

He is certain of other things when he can affirm their existence with a certainty equal to his own. All ideas are brought to trial. Some he finds innate, some acquired and partly self-originated. In the first class he places the existence of God. Inquiring into the origin of this idea shows that it does not come from ourselves. It must be implanted by a being who has all fullness in himself - i.e. by God. For, says Descartes, all the attributes of God are beyond me. He is Infinite, I am finite. He is Holy, I am not. I am not perfect. Hence such an idea can come only from an actually infinite and holy Being. Thus Descartes reaches his first proof of the existence of God by the fact that we find the idea of God within us and that we cannot of ourselves produce such an idea.

His second proof comes from the knowledge of our imperfections. For since we know that we are imperfect it follows that there must exist a being more perfect than we are whom we depend on.

The most evident proof of the existence of God however, he claims, comes from



the conception of God himself. Among all its different ideas the mind singles out the chiefest, that of the most perfect being and finds that it possesses necessary existence in itself. (Meditation III, Princ. of Phil. Pt I)


Having become sure of the existence of God Descartes advances to his doctrine of two substances. He defines substance as that which so exists that it needs nothing else for its own existence. God is the highest substance and is his own cause. Both mind and matter require the co-operation of God for their existence. Each has attributes, mind thoughts and matter extension but they have nothing in common. A similar dualism exists between soul and body. This (body) he regarded as an automatic automaton made by God within which the soul dwelt.

From this dualism two conclusions were possible. If held with great strictness the dualism of Malebranche is reached. He maintained that there is no interaction between soul and body. What takes place in one is not the cause but the occasion for what takes place in the other. All is explained by seeing everything

in God. The result of such a view is that God knows us not we who know him. Individuality is reduced to a nonentity. It hence urges an pantheism. The other view which treated the dualism ideal is essentially the position of Spinoza.

In 1670 A.D. Spinoza published his Theologico-political Treatise. Its avowed purpose was to prove that freedom of thought and teaching in philosophy is the only safeguard for religion. At the outset he distinguished between philosophy and theology and gave to each its field. The aim of the former is truth and has *Deo uerit* "a knowledge of things in their connection with each other and with the being of God," the latter has for its end obedience and piety. To these distinctions however he was far from true.

More important is his view of God. Following Descartes unity. Spinoza gives it a less extensive meaning. In his *Ethica* Pt. I, Prop XIV, he says - "Besides God there can be no substance nor can any be conceived." In this all existence actual and possible is comprehended. But God has an infinite number of attributes. Two are emphasised - thought and extension. These




are expressions of the same substance but are so controlled that they are void of all causal relations. The reality of finite things consists in the differentiation of their attributes. "Particular things" are nothing but affections of the attributes of God or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a certain and determinate manner."

Ethics I, 25. Both ideas and things are determined by the divine nature. From an inner necessity with neither freedom or design God brings all things to pass. Inoquistion supplies a final cause. Man is included in the category of particular things. He thus becomes a part of a great necessitarian scheme. Individuality and freedom so.

It thus becomes evident that Spinoza was a pantheist of a necessitarian type. God is not a person in any true sense. There is no distinction between creature and creator. Although he found this method in Descartes he departed from him in his emphasis of necessity and determinism.

It is noteworthy that while Malebranche differs from Spinoza in some minor points, and loudly denied any affinity with such a system, that the outcome in both cases is so similar.




that they bear the mark of practice.

The eighteenth century professes to be deistic in its tendencies. Lock and Leibnitz formed the thought.


As a follower of Bacon, Locke emphasized experience as the direct source of all knowledge. Henceforth empirical psychology became the basis for philosophical research. Societies for the "observation of man" were formed and remarkable experiences characterized with much accuracy. Support also came from the naive realism of the day which characterized metaphysics. Side by side were found a world of thought and a world of things. The problem was to decide how ideas which reproduced the world of things got into the mind.

To Locke fell the work of popularizing this thought. It was not entirely novel for the Cartesian dualism of thought and thing had a footing previous to "the essay". A beginning was made by inquiring into the condition of the soul at birth. Was it then a complete knowledge of the world or does this come later? He finally concludes that there are "no innate principles in the mind" even



the idea of God is formed waiting. The mind is at first a "tabula rasa". All ideas come by experience. All this has a direct bearing on his idea of God. A word is devoted to this point.

As noticed Locke's idea of God is not simple. It is "a complex idea of substance". It is the idea of ones own "thinking thing within him enlarged to infinity". Hence all the difficulties attached to the self are attached here. In Book II, Chap. XXIII, sec. 33-35. In his Essay we find the following. "The complex idea we have of God is made up of the simple ones we receive from reflection. If I find that I know some few things, and some of them, or perhaps all, imperfectly, I call from an idea of knowing twice as many which I can double again as often as I can add 8 numbers, and thus enlarge my idea of knowledge by extending its comprehension to all things existing or possible. The same I can do by knowing these more perfectly, i.e., all their qualities, powers, causes, consequences, and relations; and thus form the idea of infinite or boundless knowledge. The same also may be done of power




till we come to that we call infinite, and also of the duration of existence without beginning or end; and so from the idea of an eternal being. All which is done by enlarging the simple ideas we have taken from the operation of our own minds by reflection, or by our own senses from exterior things, to that vastness in which infinity can extend there. For it is infinity which joined to our ideas of existence, power, knowledge &c, makes the complex idea whereby we represent to ourselves the supreme being".

In Book II. Chap. XVII, sec. 1, we find that "finite and infinite" are looked upon by the mind as the modes of quality and are only attributed primarily only to those things that have parts and capable fineness by the addition of parts. Hence infinity can only be applied to God if he have parts.


It requires little reflection to show that such an idea of God is anthropomorphic, for infinity is reached by adding together a number of finite things.

Again such a view rests on an untenable foundation - the existence of the self.




Hence is Locke's proof of this. Experience convinces us that we have an intuitive knowledge of our existence - "If I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain perception of my own existence as of the pain I feel. If I know I doubt, I have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting as that thought which I call doubt" Book II, Chap. IX. See 3. Now the existence of a painful feeling is not the same as that which remains the same when the feeling passes. Locke gets confused here and hence fails to produce proof.

Neither is the following move successful. "If we know there is some real being and that nothing cannot produce anything real it is an evident demonstration that from eternity there has been something; since what was not from eternity had a beginning, and what had a beginning must be produced by something else". Book IV. Chap. 4. See. 3. This "something else" is further defined in sec. 4, "What had its being and beginning from another must also have all that which is in and belong to, its being from another too". ~~It must be~~



He then argues that whatever is in the effect must be in the cause and thus concludes that there must be supreme power and perfect knowledge in the eternal being. Now if the eternity and power of God are demonstrated from the world, the world must be eternal and self-powered itself. As I am shamed once and for all afterwards the conclusion must be contained in the premises. Again the reality of such a conclusion depends in the second place on a view of the real which is not in harmony with his dualist of mind and thing. From a momentary sensation we pass to the existence of God.

Locke however was confident in his proof of the existence of an extra-mundane deity. Such demonstrations pass with much acceptance. This is due largely to the apparent simplicity of the argument and the great show of logic on the other. Added to this is that perennial source of fallacy the abuse of crude thinking. And yet Locke's device and demonstration was not entirely without value. He drew attention to the existence of God apart from mere



pantheism. True his conception smacked of the world builder rather than a personal God but there was an advance.

Locke's immediate disciple was Bishop Berkeley. He began by adopting his master's view that ideas are the proper objects of the mind. But he soon outstripped his master. Things as matter must go. They are mere unplaceable suppositions. Even different attributes ascribed to bodies are proved by reflection to exist for the mind - not in the bodies themselves. Thus we find that "all the Choir of heaven and furniture of the earth - in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world - have not any substance without a mind." (Prin. of Human Knowledge Page 5)

The meaning of this is evident. The eternal mind produces impressions upon the finite mind according to fixed laws. We have hence to deal with spiritual not material realities.

Knowledge of the outside world becomes a psychological problem entirely.

Berkeley developed his views with considerable definiteness. His view of the relation of the Infinite to the individual is plain. "There is a mind," he says, which affects me every moment

with all the sensible impressions I perceive
and from the variety, order and manner of
these, I consider the author of them the
wise powerful and good beyond com-
prehension. (Dialogues between Hylas and
Philonus). Contrary to his intention (which
was to satisfy both science and religion) the
trend of his philosophy was toward scepticism.
The individual mind shut up to itself
without provision for "a common to all"
was assured of no reality beyond itself.

Solipsism results.


Hume carried the empirical method to
the most extreme limit. Berkeley had
rejected matter as unintelligible. Hume
did the same for mind. He held that every
philosophical term which could not be
referred to a distinct impression was
regarded as without foundation. This
resulted in absolute scepticism.

Thus was the circle completed. Bacon
began by ignoring metaphysics. Locke was
a deist of the empirical order who failed
to make good his claims. Berkeley's extreme
idealism paved the way for Hume's scepticism.
Yet Hume was euphoric in his belief

in an intelligent author of the world. In "The Natural History of Religion" we find the following: "The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational inquirer can after serious reflection suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of common sense and religion - a purpose, an intention, a design, is evident in everything; and where our comprehension is so far enlarged as to contemplate the first rise of things visible system we must adopt with the strongest conviction the idea of some intelligent cause or author".

In Vol. II, P 228 of H. C. Sheldons Hist. of Doct. the following summary of Hume's philosophy is found. 1. He cast doubt upon the existence of an external world. 2. He questioned the substantial existence of mind. 3. He attacked the validity of the Category of Causation. This seems to be the end. Mind, world, Cause &c. Empiricism leads to scepticism.

It is now in order to turn to see briefly the other great moulding factor in the thought of the eighteenth century. Spinoza and his thought are all embracing pantheism.



This Leibniz criticized. Instead of the all embracing substance which finite things are related in some vague way Leibniz substituted as many substances as there are particular unities not as modes of a universal being but as living souls. These he called monads. Spinoza would be right Leibniz said "if there were no monads for without them all would be transitory and would be reduced to mere modification and accidents because things would then have no ground of being and ~~existence~~ in themselves - no substantial basis, since this rests on the ~~existence~~ of the monad alone".


In his metaphysics he defines a monad as a simple substance, without parts, figure, extension or divisibility. It is a perceptive power which has life and a true degree of nature. Now if all being is composed of monads the lifeless passivity of Descartes must be abandoned.

Again Leibniz held that monads differ - a fact due to their difference of development. Thus souls have memory, in question and the like not because they differ in

essence from inorganic nature but because they differ in development.

These monads are only ideally related to God if at all. Each develops from within by necessity. They are independent of each other and yet each adjusts itself to the other by the "pre established harmony" of the universe or God the most highly developed monad. Thus everything works together to bring out the designs of perfect wisdom.


It is evident that such a view of God is necessitarian. Everything is fixed. Individuals are almost destroyed. If the universe must gratuitously work must be done. But this was not Leibnitz's intention. He saw that to reestablish the rights of the individuals which Spinoza had destroyed, but in his efforts to show that individuals were not mutually independent he laid himself open to the charge of Spinozism. Gradually his system was reduced to a formal rationalism. The value to be attached to the system consists in the emphasis placed upon the personality of God and the design in his works.



II.

Such was the philosophic atmosphere into which Kant was thrown. It is now in order to show (1) what was his attitude toward and (2) his own contribution. Of the first it is sufficient to say at this point that his attitude was critical; of the second that significant contribution came from his work in epistemology. These points deserve attention.


On P. 333, "Winckelmann's Hist. of Philosophy" we find a terse putting of this attitude. "He took up into himself the various notions of thought in the literature of the enlightenment and by their reciprocal supplementation matured a completely new conception of the problem and procedure of philosophy. He passed through the school of the Wolffian metaphysics and through an acquaintance with the German popular philosophy; he plunged into Hume's profound statement of problems and was enthusiastic for Rousseau's joyful future; the mathematical rigor of the Newtonian natural philosophy, the fineness of the psychological analysis of the origin of human ideas and notions found in English literature, derived from



Toland and Shaftsbury to Voltaire - all these had found in young Kant a true co-worker, full of conviction, who with a rich knowledge of the world and a admirable sagacity, and also, when it was in place with taste and wit, though far from self complacency and boasting united typically within himself the best features of the enlightenment."

As to the second it has been already noticed that his great work was done along the line of epistemology. Incited by Hume's denial of causation (see Inaugural address 1770) Kant began an examination of the human mind with the aim of finding out the conditions and factors of knowledge as well as its extent. This examination resulted in his "Critique of Pure Reason" afterwards supplemented by the "Critique of the Practical Reason" and the "Critique of the Judgment".


Such a departure from recognized methods found little support from either Rationalist or Empiricist. The former denied all knowledge from innate ideas without taking any account of the



dependence upon experience. The latter denied it from a combination of sensations from without. In one point the two schools came together - the passivity of the mind. Locke and his school had the tabula rasa - the Rationalists had something given from without. Kant was the contrary, advocated both the activity and passivity of the mind. He found the mind passive in the material given in the myriad of sensations, perceptions and affections of the senses, but active in the formation of all this raw material into a system of knowledge according to fixed forms. He disagreed also with the Rationalist for while claiming that the mind has shaping faculties he equally maintained that these must have something to work upon. Reason may work in abstractions but the fabric so completed is not necessarily real. He was thus a staunch advocate of the working over raw material by means of the fixing of thought forms in order to get knowledge. This notion of having reason improve -

lows upon itself is the keynote of Kant's thought. In many circles however, emphasis is placed on the idea that human knowledge is limited & phenomena with the unsettling idea that this is all we can know. Such a view is dispelled by a glance at history. If Kant's contribution were limited to this point alone he would be but an echo of his predecessors. This point has an interesting history.

Kant's philosophical life had a pre-critical and a critical history. During the former he became influenced by the writings of Hume. From him he derived the doctrine of things in themselves. During the latter period he mistook his indebtedness from Hume for a result of his own thinking and thus ended in a dualism between theoretical and practical reason. Had he not overlooked this point his followers would have had little to accomplish. As it was his practical philosophy was both complimentary and opposition to his theoretical.




In his theory of knowledge, however, he made it pretty clear that cognition is governed by fixed forms of thought. All experience must be arranged before knowledge results. Similarly, the moral law comes under these forms. But with the moral law there is this difference. Thought forms must be observed. Not so the a priori moral law which we can accept or reject at will. If accepted an unnecessary struggle between duty and inclination follows. Thus the moral law has need of experience or it could never get going; if it has experience it is continually at war with its contents.

If this idea has any value it is due to the fact that Kant made euphotic the conflict between duty and inclination together with the superior claims of the former. In itself the proposition is unthinkable.

Yet Kant's Ethical Theology was a vital contribution to a vital thesis. He began by inquiring into the conditions of ethical experience. This

he finds to be in the "thou shalt" or categorical imperative. Such a position seems impregnable. He then discusses what more is included in the "ought". Certainly a "can" for a command is absurd unless addressed to a being capable of acting in harmony with it. A fair ability to do implies the possibility of non-performance. Hence free personalities are of prime importance. Kant also made a valuable contribution in his testimony to immortality. This he postulates on the ground that the conflict between the higher and the lower self cannot in this life be brought to a victorious conclusion. Hence an infinite existence for the soul is demanded.


Lastly his view of God is most valuable. Previous to Kant's time the balance of discussion along these lines had been relative to a demonstration of the existence of God. To this traditional way of looking at things he applied his critical method. The time-worn arguments used in this



"proof" had been in the main three - the ontological, the cosmological and the teleological. The following is his criticism.

1. The ontological proof. This is the argument. The existence of a most real being is a possibility; existence is implied in the conception of all reality; hence the most real being necessarily exists. To this Kant replied that existence is by no means a reality but the position of a thing with all its attributes. Being is merely a logical copula which does not enlarge the content of the subject. The most real being may be conceived as most real but should be conceived as only possible and not actual. Effort spent on this kind of reasoning is wasted.

2. The Cosmological Argument. This too infers the existence of God from the necessity of existence. Because a thing exists an absolutely necessary being must exist as its cause. This argument is defective because from the phenomenal and accidental a necessary being




which transcends experience is postulated. But granted the validity of the argument Kant finds that we have not reached the idea of God. For this reason a further supposition is added which makes that being alone necessary which includes all reality within itself. This is a return to the ontological argument.

3. The Physico-theological proof resumed. This starts out with a determinate experience and attempts to infer the existence of a supreme being from the harmonious arrangement of things in the world. Much design is noted in the universe. This points to a cause for design which works for wisdom and intelligence. This cause must be most real; the most real being has the necessary existence. In answer Kant pays a high tribute to this argument, but maintains that it cannot be made proof. It may be used as evidence of the existence of God but not as proof. From it a world builder might be made out, nothing more. Assistance is sought from the cosmological proof and the world builder becomes the

necessary being back of the content. We thus have an absolute being with perfection corresponding to that of the world. But this being is not most perfect. This comes by resort to the ontological proof. And the circle is thus completed. The teleological argument rests on the cosmological and this on the ontological. Nothing results. (Schwegler Hist. of Philosophy). What then was Kant's idea of God? This he states in unmistakable terms in his "Critique of Pure Reason" p. 393. (Bohm's Phil. Lib.) After having shown the impossibility of demonstrating the existence of God he says "If from a practical point of view the hypothesis of a Supreme and all-sufficient Being is to maintain its validity without opposition it must be of the highest importance to define this conception in a correct and rigorous manner as the transcendental conception of a necessary being, to eliminate all phenomenal elements (anthropomorphisms in its most extended signification) and

at the same time to overthrow all
contradictory assertions - be they
atheistic, deistic or anthropomorphic.
This is far easier very easy, as the same
arguments which demonstrated the
inability of human reason to affirm
the existence of a Supreme Being, must
be alike sufficient to prove the invalidity
of its denial. For it is impossible to gain
from the pure speculation of reason
demonstrations that there exists no Supreme
Being, as the ground of all that exists,
or that this being possesses none of those
properties which we regard as analogical
with the dynamical qualities of a
thinking being, or that as the anthropomorphists
would have us believe it is subject to all
the limitations which sensibility imposes
upon those intelligences which exist in
the world of experiences.

"A Supreme Being is, therefore for the
speculative reason a mere ideal,
though a faultless one - a conception
which perfects and crowns the system of
human cognition, but the objective reality
of which can neither be proved nor disproved




by pure reason. If this defect is ever supplied by a moral theology, the problematic Transcendental Theology which has preceded will have been at least serviceable as demonstrating complete determination fit which it has furnished, and the ceaseless testing of the conclusions of a reason often deceived by sense, and not always in harmony with its own ideas. The attributes of necessity, infinitude, unity, existence apart from the world (and not as a world soul), eternity - free from conditions of space, omnipotence, and others, are pure transcendental predicates; and thus the accurate conception of a Supreme Being, which every theology requires, is furnished by Transcendental theology alone. Such was his idea. It remains to show the practical benefits to be derived therefrom.

1. He admits the existence of his being because "it enables him to answer all other questions relating to the contingent, and to give reasons the most complete, satisfaction as regards the unity which it aims at attaining in the world of experience."

2. He "cogitates merely the relation of a perfectly unknown being to the greatest possible systematic unity of experience, solely for the purpose of employing it as the schema of the regulative principle which directs reason in its empirical exercise" — "It is cogitated only in behalf of the systematic unity of experience — but of this being we have not the least conception." "Critique of the Pure Reason" P. 416. Again the unity of reason is the unity of system.

He also gives several respects in which this idea is supposed to produce. 1. The regulative principle may be considered as the Ego considered as a thinking nature or soul. 2. The idea of God or the one all sufficient cause of all cosmological series. Of this he says "we have not the slightest grounds absolutely to admit the existence of an object corresponding to this idea; for what can empower us to affirm the existence of a being of the highest perfection — because we possess the conception of such a being". P. 420. Later he says that the existence of the world




makes the hypothesis necessary and the idea of this being is a demand upon reason for unity or a reference to a cause. Hence he says "The hypothesis of a supreme intelligence, as the sole cause of the universe - an intelligence which has for us no more than an ideal existence, is accordingly always of the greatest service to reason". P. 420.

Again the restriction of the idea to a regulative influence is a preventive of error. 1. It prevents the error of inactive reason. (P. 422). 2. Of prevented reason. Just what these are he does not make clear.

Lastly several questions are asked concerning the regulative principle. 1. Is there anything distinct from the world which contains the ground of cosmic order and connection according to general laws? Ans. Yes, for the world is a series of phenomena behind which there must be a basis cognizable by the pure understanding alone. 2. Is this being substance? Ans. The question is meaningless. 3. May we cogitate this being in analogy with the objects

of experience? Ans. yes as ideal and not as a real object, i.e. as an unknown substratum of the symptomatic order. 4. Can we assume the existence of a wise and omnipotent author of the world? Ans. We must do so but this we do not know as it is in itself but as in relation to the universe. Can I make any use of this conception in studying the world? yes, for this reason was the regulative principle given. (p 426, ff) Hence Kant is assumed of the existence of God.

This conclusion he expressed as his own conviction as follows: "Wherever I hear that some unmeasured genius has demonstrated away the freedom of the human will, the hope of the future life, or the existence of God, I am always desirous to read his book for I expect that his talent will help me to improve my own insight into these problems. Of one thing I feel quite certain, even without seeing his book, that he has not disproved any single one of those doctrines; not that I imagine




that I am myself in possession of irrefragable
proofs of them, but because the transcendental
critique, by revealing to me the whole
apparatus of our pure reason, has
completely convinced me that, as reason
is insufficient to establish affirmative
propositions in this sphere of thought
it is equally, nay even more powerless
to establish the negative on any of these points.
("Method of Trans. Müller's Trans.")

Such a conception of God is evidently
not complete. He is too far removed
from the individual. True much
support comes from the ethical side
as already noticed but even this is not
sufficient. The categorical imperative
is robbed of all considerations of happiness.
Duty is done for the sake of duty.
Between it and God there is no logical
connection. He is a mere officer of the
law coming out the demands made
by the ethical consciousness. Later Kant
in his Philosophy of Religion enjoins us to
obey the self-imposed law as the law of God.
But between the two ideas there is no
direct connection. Kant's idea of God

separates him from the world and the individual.

To sum up:- Kant's view of God is far from clear. With due allowance for his dusty and transcendental tendencies his drift is toward vital theism. While God's existence cannot be demonstrated by the speculative reason it is demanded by the practical reason. His insistence on man's moral freedom, his crude style and partially developed theories paved the way for much confusion among his followers.



In the last chapter reference was made to the confusion of thought which Kant introduced. This we now notice in some of his successors.

Fichte sought at the outset to get rid of the dualism between phenomena and "the thing in itself" which Kant had introduced. Hence he wished to show that the categories might be derived from a single starting point. This point he made active which he believed to be the ground of being.

The initial act from which all else depends is that by which the ego posits itself. Next the ego posits the non-ego - a step by which he sought to account for the external world. This act did not arise from anything imposed from without but by limits imposed on the subject from within. Such latter place by the aid of the imagination and does not come into consciousness. Hence the non ego is not due to the ego but is related to it as a mutually limiting factor. This limitation is supposed to be

for the purpose of the development of the ego; for the ultimate end of the ego is independence of all bounds toward which it constantly strives.

What ego is that which so strives? Clearly the empirical ego - the finite individual. The other ego must be the universal ego the absolute. It is however difficult to ascertain just what he meant by the ego as the starting point. Was it the same as the Absolute ego? This seems to be his view. However in the earlier part of his work this was not brought out. In later stages increasing emphasis was placed upon the subordination of the individual ego to the absolute ego of which all finite personalities were but special manifestations.

These views were most clearly brought in the treatise "On the Ground of our Faith in a Divine Government of the World". Here he assumes that the moral government of the world is divine. It becomes actuated by the right doing and is presupposed in each act performed with

a right End. Faith in such an order is
faith in God for this active moral order is
God. Reason cannot go beyond the moral
order of the world to a designer and affirm
a separate Cause. If such a conclusion
is warranted what is gained? Such a
Being would be distinct from the
world and persons. If personhood
and self-consciousness be added the
Cause is brought to level with finite
personalities. Hence he concludes
that a conception of God as a separate
substance is self contradictory. This
reduces the idea of God's existence to a
moral order.

Fichte's later idea of God may be gathered
from extracts from two of his sources:-

"The Eternal All
Lives in my life and sees in my beholding.
Nought is but God, and God is nought
but Life.

Clearly the veil of things rises before thee;
It is thyself, what though the mortal dies
And hence thou livest but God in thine reckoning
If thou wilt look through that which lives
beyond this death,

The veil of things shall seem to thee as veil,
And unveiled thou shalt look upon the life
dear".

To sum up: Fichte made an attempt at
getting rid of the dualism introduced by
Kant. This paved the way for monism. But
in getting rid of the dualism he urged
toward pantheism. He did not maintain
the personality of God. His moral faith
in such a being causes for short of the
belief in a unitary first cause. It also
defeats any consistent theory of knowledge.
"Naught is but God, ~~His moral faith~~
~~in such a being causes~~ destroys the
finite individual. Human freedom
goes.

Such a view is also destructive of morals.
By it evil and good are attached to the
Absolute - a fact which becomes more
evident in later writers of the same type.


Schelling was an outcome of Fichte.
His earlier writings "On the Possibility of
a Form of Philosophy" and "On the Ego"
show the necessity of a supreme principle
similar to Fichte's. From him he
also obtained his method of deduction.

from consciousness from which he elaborated a philosophy of nature which proceeded in an ascending scale from the most elementary forces of matter to that of the highest development of conscious life. Such marks the first stage.

In the second stage he deals with the problem of human freedom. This he treats as nominal. Individual action is pre-ordained by necessity through which all orderly development is produced. This reminds of Leibnitz's pre-harmony and points to something back of the harmony in which all things are brought together.

This something becomes the "Eternal Consciousness" - the basis of intelligence and law of freedom of the finite. It is a simple proposition and hence can never be made the object of knowledge; rather it is reached by faith.

His next step is shown in his "Philosophy of Identity". In this consciousness is no longer the starting point but the Absolute implied in it. Here he went over to dogmatism. The Absolute reason becomes the world as the eternal and



unchanging unity of the real and ideal. The absolute can thus only be grasped by "intellectual intuition" which is a copy of the Absolute and the union of real and ideal.

Concerning this view Pflunder in his "Development of modern Theology" P. 64 says. "That this attempt was foreordained to failure is manifest; if it lies at all within the range of our powers of knowledge, to trace the genesis of the world from the absolute (which must be denied) this would in any case be rendered least possible by the assumption of this empty abstract conception of the Absolute as the simple indifference of opposites, how by its means the rich variety of the real world could be explained, is quite inconceivable." It is evident that Schelling saw the slunder for he reconstructed his Philosophy of Identity on a theosophical basis. The last stroke was worse than the first.

In 1804 he brought out his treatise on "Philosophy and Religion". Here he makes

no attempt to develop the finite from the infinite. In 1809 he held that indifference of opposites is the source of God's being. This unity differentiates God into the antithesis of nature and intelligence which united constitute the actual life of God. A fair nature in God, he claims, precedes intelligence as a basis and without this personality is not conceivable. But this nature is blind unnecessary instinct which is behind all chaos. Desire for order are the part of this basis produced reason which united to nature becomes free and reduced chaos to order.

Since reason has to contend with this dark basis the transformation from chaos to spirit can only be gradual. Beings are springing from this dark basis true wills of their own but since they originated in God they are swayed by the universal will. Conflict between these forces in man produces evil. It thus appears that evil is traced to God and the one good and the other are the other.

Schelling held pantheism. all things he concluded are but different forms


of the self-realisation of the Absolute in
which everything is united. This idea
became more and more vague until
the personality of God was merged in
a kind of pantheism.

The unit has failed to find much
development in Schelling except developed
Confusion, but since Hegel found
some affinity in the above philosophy
it has been thought well to put in these
incoherent passages.

Hegel worked for a time in harmony
with Schelling. Like him the subject of
philosophy was the Absolute. But they
soon parted company. Schelling's
conception of the Absolute was that of
the indifferent nature and spirit. Hegel
believed the Absolute to be spirit itself - the
source of nature. As he puts it in his
Schlegelworte "In Schelling's philosophy,
the absolute is, as it were, shot out of a
pistol" — The first of these changes refers
to the mode of attaining the idea of the
absolute — through intellectual intuition.
This Hegel changes for a kind of
evolution. The second relates to the

manner in which the Absolute is understood and expressed - as an absence of all finite distinctions. The third change has to do with methods. (See Schlegel Hist. of Phil. P. 340)

Hegel's fundamental proposition concerning this Absolute substance is that it can be known. In this he is opposed to Kant. As Hegel puts it in his "Philosophy of Religion" Part III, "Philosophy has the purpose to know the truth, to know God, for he is the Absolute truth, in so far that nothing else in comparison with God and his explanation is worth our pains. He defines the essential nature of the Absolute to consist in living development through a series of steps. This was practically a return to Fichte's method of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The world becomes the process of development of the Absolute. He reveals himself through nature and man. He is Spirit and reveals himself by "unfolding" and man cannot plead that he does not understand God for it is not through limitation that man understands God but "the Spirit of



God in man"; it is, to use the speculative expression which has been employed "the self-consciousness of God which knows itself in man's knowing".

Now as the Absolute thought and act are identical it is richly necessary to follow out this thought in its natural order to get at the whole system of reality. This Hegel does in three branches. 1. Logic, 2.


Philosophy, and 3. Philosophy finished. In logic he says, "pure being makes a beginning. By this he means I mean Being without any characteristic. By this speculative fancy and this reconciliation thought is carried forward from lowest to highest until the ideal world is reached and thought is eternalized in nature. In this evolutionary nature passes through its triads of properties, forms and structures until now the culmination is reached. From here the return movement is made by which thought recognizes itself again in the Absolute. ^{P.} The above view is far from clear. Ambiguous centres about 1. The absolute, 2. Finite

Being. We seem to have nothing but thought in the first instance. This begins to develop along certain lines until man and the world are explained. Absolute idealism becomes complete.

This view has passed with current commendation because of the oversight of certain so-called thinkers. In itself, ambiguities and abstractions are not wanting. Of these the constant confusion of Thought and thought is not the least. "In the beginning thought" - later a development into concrete forms.

A thought without a thinker is a strange combination. Hence to see any light we are obliged to interpret thought in another way. It may mean the process of thinking. But even this is not so clear. Our mental activity in no way co-incides with objective reality. This corresponds to the content of thought. But even here we have not escaped difficulty.

1. Things and finite personalities as content of the Absolute do not provide for human knowledge of the same.




- 2 Again if the Absolute is the all, human freedom is reduced to a fiction. Different personalities are but different forms of the divine selfrealization.
- 3 The bearing of such a view on the problem of evil is of the greatest importance. In such a development how is evil possible? Evidently if possible at all it must be attached to God.
- 4 The love of God Duesen must be cast aside there because new modes of divine realization. His love must be love for himself.
5. The whole scheme seems to part with the By getting rid of the Transcendence of God Hegel fell into an equal difficulty - immanence.

But Hegel's work is not without value. Kant had connected the intellectual experience of man with the divine life but had separated the ethical experiences from the same. It was Hegel's work to root these ethical experiences in the divine life as well. Hence the world becomes a moral order as well as a rational order. Again Hegel insisted

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on the immensity of divine reason
in the world. This in a measure opposed
the agnostic reticence of Kant and the
mystical theories of Schelling. God is
neither unknowable nor an identity
without distinctions. But in rebutting
these errors he fell into the questionable
extremes noted above.

Prof. Seth in a series of lectures before
students at Princeton said "The appearance
of man becomes identical with the
Creative God; man creates himself
and at the same time brings God to
birth. One such an interpretation
Hegelianism plainly declines upon the
level of the purely materialistic theories;
and however we may judge of
Hegel's own meaning and intention,
history shows that his danger is inherent
in his method of statement and in
the excessive emphasis laid on the
doctrine of immensity". Such are
some of the evident errors into which
the doctrine of immensity carries us
when pressed to the extreme.
Following in the wake of Hegel are a




certain class of writers known as Neo-Kantians or English Hegelians. Neither of these centres are entirely satisfactory for the English followers of Hegel pretend to supplement the teaching of their master while the Neo-Kantians differ widely from Kant. But the name is perhaps of little importance since the term has now a recognized place in the literature of philosophy.

Such a phase of thought is ably represented by the late Thomas Hill Green of Oxford. Incidentally in the critical work done in his "Introduction to Kant" - a work of recognized thoroughness - the drift of his philosophy becomes evident. His system centres on the unity and identity of the self which makes possible the experience of an intelligible world. He showed and for all the fallacy of the empirical method which continually vacillated between the activity and passivity of the self. But respecting the nature of this self or spiritual principle Green was far from clear. In his "Introduction" P. 152 he says in regard

to the possibility of knowledge." And it has been found that it is only possible as the progressive actualization in us of a self-consciousness in itself complete, and which in its completeness includes the world as its object ——— Thus while we are the area based it is in us the presence in us of God, as the self-conscious source of reality, that at once gives us the idea of God and of our eternal self, and renders superfluous the further question as to their real existence; on the other hand it is because for all this presence, we are but emerging from finitude as animals we are parts, — "Knowledge then is possible through the divine actualization in us. It works through us. Here we find the old difficulties."


In his Prolegomena to Ethics these views become more prominent. Some passages deserve notice. On P. 40 we find the self called "the single actual self-conscious principle by whatever name it may be called." Later he calls it a spiritual principle "the eternally complete



consciousness". Other references to the self might be made but the variations would be verbal. It becomes the "medium and sustainer" It makes nature and nature is said to result from the spiritual principle.

Now all this is very confusing when we remember that the "self" is nothing apart from the world, but a part of the relation which it sustains. This was pointed out by Mr Balfour in an article in Green's Metaphysics published in Mind 17. 80. "We must allow that it is as correct to say that nature makes mind as that mind makes nature; that the world created God as that God created the world."

Mr Green takes some time in establishing his spiritual principle in nature. His next point is to ascertain the relation of man to that principle. In making this attempt Mr. Green falls into confusion between "our consciousness" and the eternal consciousness. The former is reduced to a "sensitive organism" which consists



in the relation between the vibrating ether and the optic nerve. "We are not entitled to say that anything is outside consciousness" does not make clear whose consciousness, ours or the eternal consciousness.

Mr P. G. he says "the opposition of without and within has no application. A within implies a without and we are not entitled to say that anything is without or outside consciousness for extended being being a relation which like any other relation exists only in the medium of consciousness only between certain objects as they are for consciousness. Cannot be a relation between consciousness and anything else". Just what consciousness is intended here is not clear. He is moreover bordering on materialism and pantheism. If God is not the all man is an organism. If he be the all man is a part of God. True his materialism is not of the crude lump sort which makes matter independent of relations for intelligence, for Green is emphatic in his belief in the permanence

of relations, but in reducing man to an organism the tendency is toward motuatism.

The same confusion between the Eternal consciousness and our consciousness is found in the following. "If we examine the constituents of any perceived object — we shall find alike that it is only for consciousness that they can exist and that the consciousness for which they can exist cannot be merely a series of phenomena or a succession of states." The question is whose consciousness is meant.

Again the Eternal consciousness understands all possible relations and all reality. Partial truths are realized through us. Hence in the Eternal consciousness there exists partial and complete truth. Mr. Green does not explain what prevents a partial truth from becoming a complete truth when the Eternal consciousness is doing all the work.

On P. 67 all this comes out with force. "Our consciousness" may mean either of two things; either a function of the


animal organism which is being made gradually and with interruptions, a vehicle of the eternal consciousness; or that eternal consciousness itself as making the animal organism its vehicle." Clearly we have here both materialism and pantheism.

Finally after admitting that the eternal consciousness does all the work he has a great deal to say about the "we" and the "our". He refers to "our knowledge", "a related whole" as far as it is ours, "we imagine" and the like. But forgetting the things which are behind Mr Green passes on to remark that "all particular knowledge of these relations is a picking up of the form which the continual action of the eternal consciousness in and upon the sentient life makes possible". P. 73. So much for the relations of God to the world.

Our next concern is with man's freedom. As noted above (quotation from P. 67) it is evident that freedom is impossible. For "our circumstances" become either a function of the animal organism or the

1
Eternal Consciousness itself".

The direct bearing of the above on a consistent theory of knowledge is also apparent. Such implies at least three necessary conditions - a free knowing subject having identity, a world cast in thought forms, and a unitary principle which establishes a relation between them. As pointed out elsewhere Mr. Green has failed in the first instance. The self is neither free nor self-identical. In fact it is only by verbal haggling that any place is left for the self at all. Freedom and self-identity go. In regard to the second condition he is equally at fault. While admitting that the world is a system of relations for thought he omits one very important factor - the relation of the eternal will to the world, i.e. while the relations are the result of eternal energy, the will must be constantly present to sustain it. Again the world becomes at times identified with God so that the object vanishes. Lastly the eternal consciousness becomes identified at one time with the human consciousness



and at another with the world, so that instead of establishing a relation between subject and object we have a kind of pantheism.

Such are the snags necessarily attending any view which places great stress on the immensity of God.

These snags Mr. Bradley sought to correct in his book entitled "Appearance and Reality". As Prof. Seth says in his "Lectures on Theism" P. 49 "Mr. Bradley has always protested against the reduction of the life of the world to a set of logical categories, and in this volume he recalls his fellow theologists from a too narrow humanism to an insight into the vastness of the sustaining life that operates unspont throughout the universe".

To Mr. Bradley the life of the Absolute was the most real of all things. This seems so evident that it is incredible that a human being should ever forget that he is a finite portion in the great whole. And yet the theme of Mr. Bradley's work is to draw attention to this great truth. Orthodox Anglicanism taught that the

the Absolute realized himself by means of the human consciousness and in fact existed really through men's lives. Against this view Mr Bradley set his face. Stress is placed upon the Superhuman Character of the Absolute which transcends all human possibilities of thinking and being. Such it was hoped would act as a check upon current speculation of an opposite type.

In checking one error however Mr Bradley falls into another. He begins by making a search for reality and finds it in the life of the Absolute. In distinction our world of knowledge and experience is set off as "mere appearance", "irrational", "self-contradictory" - terms showing the illusiveness of all such according to the writers point of view.

All human knowledge is likewise defective because relational. It makes distinctions in qualities but these are never reduced to a real unity. Such is evidenced by the relation of subject and object. Now in the Absolute perfect unity is realized. The only limit of such a state

comes out from pure feeling from which all our conscious life emerges. The beginning of consciousness introduces the distinctions of knowledge into this passive unity. This unity we never actually realize and only approach it by dropping gradually our own conscious existence. It thus follows that perfect realization would lead in into unconsciousness.


Such is Mr. Bradley's method of getting rid of all difficulties. All distinctions are merged in the Absolute. "For," he says, "we can form the general idea of an absolute intuition in which phenomenal distinctions are merged - a whole become immediate at a higher stage without losing any richness - a total experience where mind and thought and feeling may all and more be one".

To supplement this appearances are "merged", "fused", "blended", "absorbed", "run together", "dissolved in a higher unity" and "transmuted". So the individual never can in himself become a harmonious system. In the complete gift and

dissipation of this personality, he as such must vanish.

Such is the Pantheism with which Mr. Bradley concludes. The Absolute becomes the all.

On P. 580 we find that the Absolute is "inscrutable, and on P. 489 we read that "vagueness and error and evil all are caused by, and all essentially contribute to the wealth of the Absolute". This throws some light on the nature of the Absolute. An evidently this light is not favorable to morals. "The Absolute is not personal, nor is it moral, nor is it beautiful or true". But with all his errors Mr. Bradley was aiming at a truth. As he says P. 557, "It is against both sides of the mistake (transcendentalism and immanence) it is against this empty transcendence and this shallow pantheism, that our pages may be called one sustained polemic." His contribution to theistic thought consisted, 1. In showing the necessity of a middle ground and 2. in pointing out that the Absolute does not derive existence from the finite.




The most recent retrocession of this kind is found in a book entitled "The Conception of God" by Prof. Royce of Harvard. As the title of the book indicates, direct pursuit originally pointed toward the study of God. It is of supreme interest, however, that in this inquiry the problem of human freedom becomes most prominent.

The Conception of God, characterized by much vagueness, is known as Idealistic monism - which holds that all phenomena, spiritual and material are from spirit. According to this view provision is made for the existence of the Absolute by admitting "a Divine self-consciousness" inclusive of our personal consciousness and that such existence is barely provisioned by which conscious selves can be maintained. The important question for us is "Are there many individual minds or is there but one?" If the former be true the reality of human freedom and moral responsibility becomes possible, if the latter human beings become mere automata.


To clear the way for his view of human freedom Prof. Royce devotes some time to a discussion of the individual. He claims that the individual has been neglected and that the assertion of the activity of the individual should be preceded by "the consideration of the whole category of Individuation". This includes consideration from both theoretical and ethical standpoints. Emphasis has been placed upon the latter. If it be claimed that the dignity of the individual demands its separate existence, the counter-claim might be made that the individual is logical as well as ethical and thus subject to the same laws as other individual objects.

For this reason he decides to treat the individual as though it had no ethical significance. With this end in view he follows Thomas and Duns Scotus through a labyrinth of argument and finally emerges emphatically sounding claiming that he must do something on his own account.

His search shows that there are various




sorts of segmentation in the world, each of which may be called an individual. But an individual means more than the mere presence of segmentation - it includes also uniqueness. But we cannot be sure of this from experience for this gives the bare fact of segmentation; nor from logic for this deals with thought forms. From this deadlock the Professor escapes by giving the evolution of the individual. "Individuality" he claims "is like a ferment. Introduce the germ fit into your world of knowledge and the universe soon swarms as with yeast, and individuality bubbles out everywhere. For in relation to all individuals you can define countless other individuals. But the first individuals you can only know by breathing the breath of a new life into the otherwise dead and stubbornly categories of much abstract theory. Man individuates the objects of his knowledge because he is an ethical being. God individuates the objects of his own world and knows them as individuals for



no other reason", P. 259. — that is an object becomes individual because it is that in which interest is taken.

This he illustrates by a child's attachment to his playthings. First conscious ideas are of universals not individuals. Any one of a number of toys gives equal satisfaction. In the child's development however, a moment comes when he indicates an "exclusive passion" for some one toy. That moment he makes the individual. Thus he concludes "objects thus are individuals in so far as they are unique & pericences of essentially exclusive ideals".


Passing to the moral individual the same argument is used. Socrates is an individual because the Absolute finds in him the fulfillment of an exclusive interest such as no one else. "from God's point of view shall fulfill. He is the object of will. Thus he concludes, "the will individuates according to his own needs and if it needs for its fulfillment free



individuals, it will possess these and its life will be constituted by this.

Having derived the individual an inquiry is made into its nature. This shows that "every finite moral individual is precisely as real and as self-conscious as the moral order requires him to be." He is unique in that a moral goal is set before him which becomes the object of his exclusive interest. He is self-conscious by knowing his interest in his ideal as an exclusive interest. He is free but the freedom of each finite moral individual is part of the Divine freedom - not an absolutely separate part, but a part having its own relative freedom - a differentiated element of the freedom. P. 273.

This view of freedom becomes more evident in the Chapter entitled, "The self-consciousness of the Absolute". On P. 278, we find "What I am conscious of when I am aware of myself, that at the least is a moment in the whole consciousness of the Absolute, and so must be involved in all




general theory of the positive inclusion
of all finite facts in the unity of the
Supreme Consciousness of the Absolute".
Once more on P. 302 are found "the
Absolute Unity is the unity of a series of
mutually interrelated and interpenetrating
conscious functions which while
contrasted, essentially refer to one
another and are fulfilled each in
and through the others, so that they may
well be called, by virtue of the contrast,
conscious selves, each being conscious
that the other selves, his divine fellows,
are in essence but himself fulfilled and
wholly expressed. Thus and thus only can
the Absolute be conscious of himself".
By this time Prof. Royce views the
individual as doubtless crystal
clear but for the sake of the way faring
another word is added. In discussing
the claims of the individual on P. 304 he
says "we have seen that mere immediacy
of experience, the mere fact of sense as such,
is not yet enough to constitute
individuality. The individual is not
merely this but such that its place can


be taken by "no other". And as such, the individual this as we have seen thus exists only as the object for exclusive interest, and not merely as the object for defining thought, or as the immediate datum of experience. — This individual is what it is in order that the exclusive interest of the Absolute in just this world of fact might find a free expression. The individual there is "contingent. It need not be but is."

These quotations from Prof. Royce by no means exhaust the supply. He should be heard for his much speaking. And from it the conclusion is evident that the individual is absorbed in the Absolute or too so little personality left that an equivalent result is reached. A view which includes all existence in the unfolding consciousness of the Absolute, that makes the human self not a self or robs it of all meaning attached by common sense utterly destroys the individual. This becomes a mere group of feelings — a partial item of experience through

which the Absolute realizes himself. He
it is who gives vitality and unity to
these experiences, embraces them all
and pervades them all. In Him are
encompassed joy and sorrow, good
and evil, pain and pleasure - in
short all sorts of experiences. More than
this such a view smacks of deism.
Any view of God which includes the
brothel and the gambling den, and
finds avenues for divine realization
through the slum and alley works for
righteousness less than atheism. It
would degrade pantheism to so
characterize such a system. No
distinction is made between creature
and creator, rather the creator and
creature are interposed. As Prof. Royce
himself puts it on P. 292, "The individual
experience is identically a part of God's
experience and the individual plan is
identically a part of God's --- plan".
But we hasten on. Surprises are rife.
We return from the wake of slaughtered
souls with wondering eyes to find a
more trying ordeal awaiting. This




time we are so bold to believe that "they
are free". In vain we raise our hands
in honor crying "how can these things
be"? From past instruction we learned
that the finite and infinite selves were
but two names for a lonely reality.
We were mistaken. In truth it was
with some difficulty and diverse
pricks of conscience that we discard
our distinctive dislike to the belief
that the self which argues things and
feels is but the other part of the Absolute.
However having once been told
that philosophic rigour demands
such a faith we cling to it. Professor
Royce "laughs at impossibilities and
cries it shall be done". Hence we find
in P. 224, "I shall also strenuously
insist that the individual is free
--- free with the freedom of God whose
his freedom is a portion. For there is
in his consciousness an element
which is determined by absolutely
nothing in the whole of God's life
outside of this individual self".
Later he defines "this element" as



"an attentively selected ideal", and admits that it is aiming to an element of freedom in the divine life which is "identical with what we call attention." For he continues P. 295; "in so far as in us there is rationally significant attention and in so far as this rationally significant attention is as such, the free element of the Divine life it may prove to be free in us as it is everywhere free in God". — — "Therefore, we shall maintain, in choosing the ideal, which is the one means of gaining his life in unity of self, the individual is free with identically the same freedom as God's freedom, only that the individual freedom is not the whole of God's freedom but is a unique part thereof".

And this is the end. Some how we feel that we have not "got forward". A beginning was made with the absolute as the all and after many words he is still the all. Prof. Royce still holds the orthodox Hegelian view with all its contradictions.


Perhaps his whole treatment of the



individual and the Absolute cannot
be better summarized than by giving
his own criticism of Schopenhauer's theory of
the individual. "Like the bat in the
fable, it scurries with the beasts and
flies with the birds, whenever the
two parties contend but most fail
it loves darkness and twilight."

But one word more. In a note
attached to Prof. James's essay "All
some Hegelians" are interesting experiments
is recorded. The writer was influenced
by an article written by B. P. Blood
of Amsterdam N.Y. to try the effects
of nitrous-oxide-gas-intoxication. The
effects are given in his own words.

"With me as with every other person
for whom I have heard, the keynote of
the experience is the tremendously exciting
sense for intense metaphysical
illumination. Truth lies open before
me in depth beneath depth of almost
blinding evidence. The mind sees
all the logical relations of being with an
apparently subtle and instantaneous
method which to normal consciousness



offers no parallel, and as sobriety returns,
the feeling of insight fades — — —

It is impossible to carry an idea of the
tonal character of the identification
of opposites as it streams through the
mind in this experience. — — God and
devil, good and evil, life and death,
I and thou, sober and drunk, matter
and form, black and white, quality
and quantity, shines and shadows and
shudders of honor, vomiting and
swallowing — figure in these pages
in the same momentous way" He
then gives a whole page to sentences
and phrases and winds up with "the
most coherent and articulate". "There
are no differences but differences of
degree between different degrees of difference
and no difference". This phrase he
claims has the true Hegelian ring.
But enough has been said to show that
light must be sought along another
route. This route we now enter.

IV.

The foregoing indicates the attempts made by different schools of thinkers at reaching a greater consistency of thought regarding the relation of the Infinite and finite. Such attempts save at first glance of rethatching old straw. Reflection however points to a movement resulting in more harmonious conclusions. This has not been the work of any one thinker though several have contributed much. This may be attributed however limitations. Philosophy is necessarily militant. We progress toward a finished rational life.

This progress shows an increasing tendency toward monism. Even among most diverse Theorists, the Hegelian and the Idealist, there or modified, monism is advocated. As Van Dornum says "we may look among the original philosophic or religious systems of the first rank and everywhere come meet with the tendency to monism

and it is only those of the second or third magnitude who find satisfaction in an external dualism or still greater division".

This unity of all reality is a product of modern thought. It enters into all systems of philosophy and departments of life. The all important question is what shall be the nature of this monism? Evidently not the transcendental order which results in obscurity and agnosticism; not the immanent order for this destroys the individual. As pointed out above the monism must have such a form that it shall satisfy all the demands of life. It will hence have in its elements of both transcendence and immanence, idealism and realism. This becomes more evident when considered from the standpoint of a theory of knowledge.

Since the writings of Locke, Berkeley and Hume there had not been a single contribution toward a systematic treatment of epistemology

in English until the past year. (See
Prof. Cox in Meth. Rev. for Jan. & Feb., 1898)
Recently there have been issued three
characteristic works along this line.
Instead of attempts at "demonstration"
attention centres upon consistency of
thought and knowledge. Investigation
along these lines show that the heart
of philosophy is adverse to both the
Kantian type of agnosticism, Hegelian
pantheism and sensualist materialism.
It undertakes to set forth the unity and
identity of the knowing self, the necessity
of a knowable world cast in thought
forms and the existence of a personal
"God," in whom we live and
move and have a being."
Again this investigation shows that
speculation must be secured by
observation and contact with life.
In the past much thinking has
been carried on in the closet. Present
methods demand every day experience.
In this philosophic thought becomes
more closely allied with research in
other fields. Economics is no longer

an ideally constructed system. Social life cannot be controlled by hard and fast lines. The "Ethic" man must give place to the "fact man". Ethics cast aside the categorical imperative for a more practical basis. History begins by a most careful examination of facts.

Such a method has necessarily resulted in rejecting much of the "intellectualism" which made the mind the only means of getting at truth. This method saw life through these set forms. The modern view sees knowledge through life itself. Again the old view was satisfied with one phase of life as a test of knowledge while the new tests knowledge by the whole range of life.

The coming of this revolution in thought upon Theism is evident. Faith and belief rooted in life as they are, become supplemented by philosophy. On the other hand knowledge applies stringent tests to both faith and belief to clear up inconsistencies while it leaves open the way for the demands

(for the demands) of the whole nature.
Concerning all these demands of life, but
one limit is placed - that they remain
consistent with each other and be
sanctioned by the ordinary tests of
actuality. In the past many
have followed Kant's great
clinging to "a thing in itself". These
first get sensations and then refer
them to something "out there". Present
tendencies abolish the chasm between
the subjective and objective & find
a revelation of the real in the
process of perception itself. Such a
fact places the greatest emphasis
upon the reality of the knowing self
which maintains its identity through
changing sensations and scenes.
In this much is included. It is
the key note of morals. Reject this and
neither praise, blame or development
can be attached to the individual.
In fact there would be no individual.
For the same reason the idea of
immortality would come in.
Another necessary implication of the

present view is the belief in the
existence of a unitary Being back of all
change "who upholdeth all things by
the word of his power", from whom the
human soul is not a part.


Such existence is as far removed
from Hegelianism as it is from
Locke's doctrine. It is rather a medium
between both. Many who have
been holding a religious faith
with much fear and trembling lest
a little applied logic should shatter
their ideal, take heart. On the other
hand those who find inspiration in
a study of the Absolute are not cast
down. Thus a place is left for
both feeling and logic in thisism.
Kant paved the way for this new
order as noted elsewhere. He emphasized
the importance of a single rational
system. Herbert marked a new era
by taking everything in actual life
as consistent until the contrary appeared.
Adequacy and self-contradiction have
been noted.


The above medium view is a brief


synopsis of the fundamental
ideas of Prof. Bordue P. Baume. It
insists on the personhood of the
Absolute while it also gives ample
margin for the coexistence of relations
sustained by divine energy. It
is thus opposed to pantheism. It
provides for the freedom of the
individual — inasmuch as he
is allowed a margin for the
development of character and
hence is opposed to the extreme
immanence views. It allows
the greatest margin for the
direct communication between
the Infinite and the finite and
is hence opposed to deism and
transcendentalism. Lastly since it
insists on the satisfaction of all
the demands of life space is
allowed for the immortality of the
soul.


We thus come out with emphasis
upon the three fundamental
problems in philosophy, God, human
freedom and the immortality of the


soul. On all these points modern philosophy of the above named type shows progress. Much remains to be done. We see yet darkly. But method is a great deal. The secrets of the universe are not cleared up but a few certainties have been reached. More and more is truth being placed on a rational basis.



































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